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Refugee Law is Not Immigration Law
James C. Hathaway*
1. Background
The spectacle of the governments of Austraha, Indonesia, and Norway
playing pass the parcel with 400 refugees, most of them Afghans, is not an
edifying one... Yet the issues of responsibility, over which the three
governments are arguing, are important ones which, left unsettled in this
and other cases, could only worsen the prospects for all refugees in the
longer run. For the truth is that when what agreement has been painfully
achieved between nations on how to deal with refugees breaks down, the
natural reaction is to erect even higher barriers than already exist^
In the late days of August 2001, an extraordinary saga was played out in the Indian
Ocean between Indonesia and Austraha.^ A routine surveillance flight by Australia's
Coastwatch on August 15^ detected a 20 meter wooden boat in distress some 140
kilometers northwest of Austraha's Christmas Island Territory. Because the vessel
was within the Indonesian search and rescue zone, Australia alerted officials in
Jakarta to the situation. The next day, another Coastwatch flight observed the fishing
boat still in trouble, this time with the letters "SOS" marked on the roof of the craft's
1.

2.
3.

Professor of Law and Director, Program in Refugee and Asylum Law, University of
Michigan. The assistance of Aimee Mangan of the University of Michigan Law Library
Reference Department and the comments on an earlier draft by Dr. Mary Crock of the
University of Sydney are gratefully acknowledged.
The Guardian, 30 August 2001, at 19.
The facts as stated here are primarily derived from the original decision of the Federal
Court of Australia in Victorian Council for Civil Liberties Inc. v. Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2001] FCA 1297 (11 September 2001, per North
J.) [hereafter Federal Court Decision], and from the opinions given in the subsequent
jud^ent on appeal to the FuU Federal Court of Australia in the same case, reported as
Ruddock V. Vadarlis, [2001] FCA 1329 (18 September 2001, per Beaumont and French
JJ., Black CJ dissenting) [hereafter Full Federal Court Decision].
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cabin. Australian authorities decided to take matters into their own hands, and
broadcast a call to merchant ships in the vicinity to render assistance to the sinking
boat and the 80 persons believed to be onboard. A nearby Singapore-bound container
ship of Norwegian registry, the MV Tampa, responded to the call. Arriving onsite at
the incapacitated KM Palapa 1, the Tampa's master. Captain Ame Riiman,
discovered that there were in fact five times as many passengers on the vessel as he
had been told—some 433 persons, mostly from Afghanistan, but also smaller
numbers from Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. All were rescued by the crew of the
Tampa. Captain Riiman then inquired of the Australian authorities where the
rescuees should be takeiL The Coastwatch responded that it did not know.''
Left to his own devices, the captain initially decided that because the Palapa
was of Indonesian registry and had embarked from that country, he would take the
rescuees back to the Indonesian port of Merak. But after five men threatened to jump
overboard if returned to Indonesia, he changed course toward Austraha's Christmas
Island, the nearest harbour.^ As the Tampa approached Christmas Island, however, it
was instructed by Australian officials to turn back toward Indonesia. Fearful of
exposing his crew and the rescuees to the dangers of a severely overloaded ship on
the open ocean. Captain Rirman disobeyed the Austrahan order and instead held his
position some 13.5 nautical miles from the shore of Christmas Island—just outside
Austraha's territorial seas, but still well within its contiguous zone.
The Austrahan goverrunent was adamant that the ship could proceed no further.
Of the view that the rescuees were properly the responsibihty of either Norway, the
Tampa's flag state, or of Indonesia, their place of embarkation and in which the
Palapa was registered,® Austraha threatened the Tampa with massive fines were it to
4.

"We took it for granted the Australian authorities would let us come to Christmas
Island... since it was they who asked us for assistance...": Patrick Barkham, "Havens
closed to refugees at sea," The Guardian, 28 August 2001, at 9, quoting the spokesman
for the Norwegian owners of the Tampa.
5. "Captain Rinnan said he had planned to take them to Indonesia but had been forced to
change course after threats. 'They flatly refused to go back to Indonesia and they were
threatening to jump overboard,' he said 'They were speaking in an excited, aggressive
manner. It was a tense moment. When 1 decided to go to Christmas Island because that
was the closest place, everything cahned down'": Kirsten Lawson, "Stand-off at sea over
boat people," The Canberra Times, 28 August 2001, at A-1.
6. "[Prime Minister John] Howard said the Indonesian boat had foundered in an Indonesian
rescue area and the Norwegian ship had been under a clear obligation rmder international
law to take those rescued to the nearest feasible port—^in this case, Merak, in Indonesia."
The response of the Norwegian government was that"... the issue was one for Australia
and Indonesia to solve. 'We regard this as a very complicated matter and we cannot let
the countries in the region shy away from their responsibihties,' Norwegian Foreign
Ministry spokesman Kaisten Klepsvik said": ibid.
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approach Christinas Island. The government then ordered the closure of Flying Fish
Cove, the port of Christmas Island. The Harbor Master signed an order prohibiting
all boat movements into and out of the cove, and erected barriers at the end of the
jetty. Captain Rinnan's urgent pleas to send a boat from shore to collect the sickest
people were ignored.'
Two days later. Captain Rinnan, fearing imminent deaths onboard, took the
Tampa into Australian territorial waters, stopping 4 nautical miles from the shores of
Christmas Island. Within 2 hours, 45 soldiers from the Australian Special Armed
Services boarded the ship. While the soldiers' purpose was ostensibly to provide
medical assistance to the rescuees and to ensme the security of the ship's crew, the
Special Armed Services troops also relieved Captain Rinnan of control of the Tampa.
Tlie next day, the Norwegian ambassador was allowed to visit the Tampa. TTie
rescuees made clear to him that they were seeking recognition of their refiigee status,
explicitly invoking their right to be protected under the 1951 Refugee Conventioa^
2. The Responses
In response to the standoff near Christmas Island, two legally absolutist strategies
were being advanced on the Australian mainland. On August 29, the same day that
Austrahan troops took control of the Tampa, the Australian government tabled the
Border Protection Bill 2001. Passed in less than one hour by the House of
Representatives, this bill pmported retroactively to authorize the use of "reasonable
force" against any ship just inside the Australian territorial sea to force that ship
outside the territorial sea. Australian officers were given "absolute discretion" to
implement the law. Critically, the bill provided that no person on board a ship
7.

8.

It was reported that "[a]n Australian military helicopter lowered temporary toilets, food
and fresh medical supplies on to the deck [of the Tampa], but the govenunent wiU not let
aid agencies board the ship": Patrick Barkham and Owen Bowcott, "Australia sends more
troops to block ship," The Guardian, 31 August 2001, at 12.
It is worth noting that Australia, in line with general international practice, has
recognized a significant proportion of recent Afghan asylum seekers as genuine
Convention refugees. "The world agrees that the Taliban are abominable. They oppress
their own people, especially women. They have killed hundreds of minority Shi-ite
Muslims. Yet when a few dozen desperate Afghans turn up in Australian waters. Prime
Minister John Howard calls them 'bogus refugees' and queue-jumpers! If the Afghans are
not genuine refiigees, who is?": Haroon Siddiqui, "Muslims also to blame for Afghan
refugee mess," Toronto Star,2 September 2001, at A-13. Indeed, shortly after the events
of the Tampa, the Federal Court of Australia held that young, able-bodied men genuinely
at risk of forcible recruitment by the Taliban could qualify as Convention refiigees: David
McLeiman, "Court rules Taliban conscripts refiigees," Canberra Times, 9 October 2001,
at A-4.
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subject to removal would have any remedy against Australia, and moreover that no
such person could seek recognition of his or her refiigee status. This bill—^which was
to have operated "in spite of any other law"—^was, however, defeated in the
Australian Senate in the early hours of the next morning.'
A no less determined legal strategy was laimched by refugee advocates on
August 31^.'° On the basis of the alleged unlawftdness of the detention by Australia
of the asylum seekers aboard the Tampa, the Federal Court of Australia was asked to
issue writs of habeas corpus and mandamus to require the government to bring the
rescuees to Australia where they would be entitled to enter that country's refugee
determination ^stem.^' The applicants initially prevailed before Mr. Justice North,
who issued a writ of habeas corpus on September ll"', requiring all the asylum
seekers to be brought to the Austrian mainland. A week later, however, a majority
of the Full Federal Court reversed his order, afBrming the prerogative power of the
Australian government to act outside the scope of its own immigration laws where
necessary to prevent the unauthorized entry of non-citizens.'^
9.

Under the subsequently passed Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers)
Bill 2001, however, the official opposition supported the government's effort to validate
the actions taken in respect of the Tampa: Australian Department of Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs, "Notice of Legislation Change Effective 27 September 2001,"
www.immi.gov.au/legislation/lc0901_4.htm, visited 23 October 2001.
10. The applications were brought by the Victorian Council for Civil Liberties and by a
Melbourne solicitor, Mr. Eric Vadarlis, who wished to provide pro bono legal assistance
to the refugee claimants. Both Amnesty International and the Australian Human Rights
and Equal Opportunities Conunission sought and were granted permission to intervene in
support of the apphcations. Sadly, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
the organization entrusted by the Refugee Convention to ensure respect by state parties
with the refugee treaty, did not intervene. The latter fact may explain the relative
marginality of the salient international law arguments in the proceedings at first instance,
and on appeal to the Full Federal Court of Australia.
11. The Australian refugee coordinator for Amnesty International was quoted as saying, 'Tf
they are asylum-seekers, then they should be given asylum"; Emma MacDonald, "ALP
backing exposes lack of moral leadership; Arrmesty," The Canberra Times, 29 August
2001, at A-1. Accord Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, "Asylum-seekers afloat in uncertainty," The
Canberra Times, 30 August 2001, at 11; "Assuming, as is statistically highly likely, that
at least some of the people on board the Tampa may have a valid claim to refugee status
under the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status ofRefiigees, there is a clear obligation
upon Australia to allow them access to our refugee determination procedures. That
obligation exists unless and until a determination has been made that a potential claimant
is in fact not a refiigee."
12. "In my opinion, the executive power of the Commonwealth, absent statutory
extinguishment or abridgement, would extend to a power to prevent the entry of non-
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Even as these court proceedings were unfolding, the Australian government
proceeded to negotiate an interstate arrangement whereby the asylum seekers would
be taken to other countries. On September 3'^, all those who had been rescued from
the Palapa were transferred from the Tampa to the HMAS Manoora, an Australian
amphibious troop ship with extensive medical facilities on board. The original plan
was to sail to Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea, from whence about one-third of
the asylum seekers (primarily family groups) would be flown to New Zealand, which
had agreed to allow all persons determined by it to be genuine refiigees to remain in
its territory. The remaining two-thirds of the refugee claimants would be flown to the
tiny and impoverished island nation of Nauru, where they would be temporarily
admitted in exchange for a payment of $A10 million worth of fuel, $A3 million for
new generators, the cancellation of $A1 million worth of hospital bills run up by
Naiuuans in Australia, refurbishment of the island's sports oval, and the provision of
sporting and educational scholarships for Nauruans to come to Australia.'^ In Nauru,
they would be housed in a makeshift camp under the guard of a private Australian
security firm while their claims to be refugees were assessed by UNHCR. Those
found to be entitled to protection would be admitted to Australia, or resettled to other
countries, including Norway, Sweden, and Canada.
While the Full Federal Court of Australia was deliberating whether to reverse
Justice North's original order, ths Manoora was already carrying the asylum seekers
away from Australia. Instead of proceeding to Papua New Guinea as originally
plaimed, the Manoora sailed directly to Nauru, where it arrived on September 18®"—
the very day on which the Full Federal Court issued its decision to vacate the writ of
habeas corpus. In addition to the refugee claimants rescued on August 26"*, the
Manoora carried an additional 237 (largely Iraqi) asylum seekers taken from another

citizens and to do such things as are necessary to effect such exclusion... Absent statutory
authority, it would extend to a power to restrain a person or boat from proceeding into
Australia or compelling it to leave": Full Federal Court Decision, supra note 1, per
French J., at paras. 193-197 (Beaumont J. agreed in this result). Leave to appeal this
decision to the High Court of Australia has been granted.
13. Patrick Barkham, 'Paradise lost awaits asylum seekers," The Guardian, 11 September
2001, at 3. Australia has subsequently entered into negotiations with Papua New Guinea
and Kiribati to receive interdicted refUgees for processing: Kirsten Lawson, 'TNG next in
line to process Australia-bound refugees," Canberra Times, 11 October 2001, at A-1.
Ultimately, however, the AustraUan government's preferred solution appears to be an
arrangement with Indonesia to force refugees who have passed through that country's
territory to return there: Kirsten Lawson, "Coahtion commits $lm for PNG deal on
asylum-seekers," Canberra Times, 12 October 2001, at A-5. This would raise serious
concerns under international refugee law: see note 28 infr.
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Indonesian fishing boat, the Aceng, which was intercepted before reaching
Austrahan territory.''*
3. How Should the Situation have heen Resolved under International Refugee
Law?
In my view, there is no basis in international refugee law to justify the Australian
government's efforts to mechanistically avoid responsibility by forcing the refugee
claimants away from its territorial waters, whether by the issuance of orders to
Captain Rinnan or by the effort to bluntly enact exclusionary legislation. But neither
is &ere a basis in international refugee law for the assertion of refugee advocates that
those rescued had a right to come to the Australian mainland in order to enter that
coimtry's asylmn system. Both these positions are unduly absolutist, and fail to
respect the carefiil compromise between the duty of protection and the continued
sovereignty of states that is at the core of the Refugee Convention.
The point of departure for legal analysis of this saga is the Refiigee
Conventionduty of non-refoulementP This duty not to return refiigees directly or
indirectly to the risk of being persecuted inheres prior to the formal verification of
refugee status, and continues until and imless those who claim to be refugees are
fairly and finally determined not to so qualify. As a simple matter of logic, this must
be so. Otherwise, it would be open to a state party to avoid its freely assmned duties
under the Refugee Convention by the simple expedient of refiising to ever inquire

14. hi stark contrast to the Australian response, the Afghan refugees were greeted in Nauru
with music and dancers, and broad smiles all around. When asked by foreign media for
their reaction to the arrival of the refugees. Pastor Tui Nalatu responded, "I've spoken to
my congregation and we are prepared to go out into boats and fish for them." Perhaps
most poignantly, another Nauruan said, "We would do the same... If we were at war,
we'd get in canoes and paddle for Fiji or Christmas Island"; Patrick Barkham, "Migrants
step ashore to flowers and fences," The Guardian, 20 September 2001, at 17.
15. It is sometimes claimed that the refugee-specific duty of non-refoulement is a matter of
customary international law. Such assertions confuse the elements of opinio juris and
genuinely conforming state practice, particularly by mistaken reliance on various
affirmations by states as evidence of practice. See eg. E. Lauterpacht and D. Bethlehem,
"The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement," 20 June 2001, at paras.
211-213 and 218, available at www.unhcr.ch. (a paper commissioned in the context of
the UNHCR's Global Consultations on International Protection). Sadly, there is in fact
regular evidence of state practice of refoulement: see eg. U.S. Committee, World Refugee
Survey, an annual publication which vividly recounts continued examples of refoulement
around the world. In the result, the duty not to expose refugees to refoulement remains at
present a matter of treaty-based law.
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whether an individual seeking to invoke treaty rights qualifies as a refugee or not.'® It
is of course true that the rights set by the Refugee Convention are those only of
genuine Convention refugees, not of every person who claims to be a refugee. But
because it is one's de facto circumstances, not the ofGcial validation of those
circumstances, that gives rise to Convention refugee status,'' genuine refugees could
clearly be irreparably disadvantaged by the withholding of protection against
refoulement pending status assessment Unless status assessment is virtually
immediate, the adjudicating state may therefore be unable to meet its duty to
implement the Refogee Convention in good faith unless it grants at least the most
basic Convention ri^ts to refugees on a strictly provisional basis.
Not only does the right to protection against refoulement inhere before status
determination, but it ^phes as soon as a refugee comes imder the de jure or de facto
jurisdiction of a state party. In contrast to those rights which are available orfy to
refugees who are physically present inside a state's territory, the Refugee
Convention grants Art. 33 protection to "refugees" without any qualification based

16. "Every refugee is, initially, also an asylum seeker, therefore, to protect refiigees, asylumseekers must be treated on the assumption that they may be refugees until their status has
been determined. Otherwise, the principle of non-refoulement would not provide
effective protection for refugees, because applicants might be rejected at borders or
otherwise returned to persecution on the grormds that their claim has not been
established": UNHCR, "Note on Intemational Protection," U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/815, at
para. 11(1993)
17. Accord UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
(1979, re-edited 1988), at para 28: "A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951
Convention as soon as he fulfils the criteria contained in the definition. This would
necessarily occur prior to the time at which his refugee status is formally determined.
Recognition of his refugee status does not therefore make him a refugee but declares him
to be one. He does not become a refugee because of recognition, but is recognized
because he is a refugee." It is therefore of some concern that French J. felt it relevant to
observe that "[t]he question whether aU or any of the rescuees are refugees has not been
determined" in the context of his consideration of whether Austraha had met its legal
duty of non-refoulement. Full Federal Court Decision, supra note 1, per French J., at
para. 203.
18. "The principle of good faith underlies the most fundamental of all norms of treaty law—
namely, the rule pacta sunt servanda... Where a third party is called upon to interpret the
treaty, his obligation is to draw inspiration from the good faith that should animate the
parties if they were themselves called upon to seek ttie meaning of the text which they
have drawn up": I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 119-120
(1984).
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on the level of attachment to the asylum state.'® This approach to refugee law
coincides neatly with the more generi view that there is no principled reason to
release states which act extraterritorially from legal obligations that would otherwise
circumscribe the scope of their authority. According to Professor Meron,
In view of the purposes and objects of hmnan rights treaties, there is no a
priori reason to limit a state's obligation to respect human rights to its
national territory. Where agents of the state, whether miUtary or civilian,
exercise power and authority (jurisdiction, or de facto jurisdiction) over
persons outside national territory, the presumption should be that the state's
obligations to respect the pertinent human rights continues. That
presunq}tion could be rebutted only when the nature and content of a
particular right or treaty language suggest otherwise.^"
Finally, the substance of the duty of non-refoulement proscribes a pushing away
from state territory, just as much as an ejection from that territory after entry. As the
American representative to the committee which drafted Art. 33 clearly observed.
Whether it was a question of closing the frontier to a refiigee who asked
admittance, or of turning him back after he had crossed the frontier, or even
of expelling him after he had been admitted to residence in the territory, the
problem was more or less the same. Whatever the case might be, whether or
not the refiigee was in a regular position, he must not be turned back to a
country where his life or freedom could be threatened.^'
Indeed, the Belgian co-sponsor of the text adopted emphasized that the duty had
been expanded to an undertaking "not to expel or in any way [return] refiigees..."^^
precisely to ensure that it was understood that the article "... referred to various
19. See generally James C. Hathaway and Anne K. Cusick, "Refugee Rights Are Not
Negotiable," (2000) 14(2) Georgetowi Immigration Law Journal 481, at 491-493.
20. T. Meron, "Extraterritoriality ofHmnanRights Treaties", (1995) i9{\) American Journal
of International Law 78, at 80-81.
21. Statement of hfr. Henkin of the United States, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.20, 1 February
1950, at 11-12. ,4ccor^^ Mr. Robinson of Israel, id. at 12-13; "The article must, in fact,
apply to aU refugees, whether or not they were admitted to residence; it must deal with
both expulsion and non-admittance..."
22. U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/L.25,2 February 1950, at 1. In the draft convention finalized by the
Working Group, the undertaking was rephrased to require states not to "... expel or
return, in any manner whatsoever, a refugee to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened..."; U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/L.32,9 February 1950, at 12.
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methods by which refugees could be expelled, refused admittance or removed."^
Thus, as discussed in more detail below,the duty of non-refoulement imposed
critical obligations on both Norway and Australia, which neither state appears fully
to have recognized.
The initial responsibility to rescue the passengers of the Palapa was primarily
that of Indonesia While both Australia and Indonesia are parties to the Convention
on the Law of Sea which imposes a duty in principle on all state parties to cooperate
in search and rescue missions on the high seas,^ the Palapa foundered outside the
rescue zone assigned to Australia under the auspices of the International Convention
on Maritime Search and Rescue.^® While not a party to that treaty, Indonesia has
filed a search and rescue plan with the International Maritime Organization, imder
which it agreed to be responsible for search and rescue operations in the zone where
the Palapa was sinking. The sighting and issuance of the distress call by Australia,
then, were life-saving actions taken by it notwithstanding Austraha's formal legal
entitlement to have devoted no resources whatsoever to surveillance in that part of
the Indian Ocean.^^ In any event, neither Indonesia's responsibility to provide search
23. Statement of Mr. Cuvelier of Belgium, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR22, 2 February 1950, at
20.
24. See text infra at notes 31-35 and 43-47.
25. "Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an
adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea
and, where circumstances so require, by way of mutual regional arrangements cooperate
with neighbouring States for this purpose": United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 21 1.L.M. 1261, entered into force 16 November 1994
[hereafter Convention on the Law of the Sea], at Art. 98(2).Indonesia ratified the treaty in
1986, Australia in 1994.
26. (1986) A.T.S. 29, done 27 April 1979, entered into force 22 June 1985 [hereafter
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue]. Australia, though not Indonesia, is a party
to this treaty which requires state parties to make provision for "adequate search and
rescue services for persons in distress at sea round [its] coasts" and specifically to "take
urgent steps to provide the most appropriate assistance available": Armex, Chs. 2.1.1 and
2.1.9 This duty inheres "regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the
circumstances in which that person is found": Annex, Ch 2.1.10.
27. International Maritime Organization Doc. SAR.2/Circ.5,19 January 1996, at Annex 5.
28. That Australia would take an interest beyond the area of its formal search and rescue
responsibility is particularly noteworthy in view of the magnitude of its formal
responsibihties. "Australia has accepted responsibility for search and rescue for an area
of47,000,000 square kilometers. This represents approximately 11 per cent (or one ninth)
of the earth's surface": Australia, Department of the Parhamentary Library, "Bills Digest
No. 8,1997-98."
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and rescue in the area in question nor Australia's practical assiunption of such
responsibihties engages legal duties under the Refugee Convention.^' This is because
the coordination of search and rescue efforts does not give rise to formal or de facto
jurisdiction in the area concerned, the minimum condition for the attribution of
responsibihties under refugee law. The territory patrolled remains in every sense a
part of the high seas, and hence (absent an illegi assertion of national authority in
such an area^°) outside of national jurisdiction.
When Captain Rinnan responded to the search and rescue call, he was acting in
accordance with long-standing customary international law, now codified in Art
98(2) of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Norway, as a state party to that
treaty, is moreover obliged to "... require the master of a ship flying its flag... to
proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of
their need for assistance..."^' Having complied with these obligations, the rescuees
onboard the Tampa were clearly under the jurisdiction of the ship's flag state,
Norway. In what may seem a cmel irony, the minimum condition for the
imposition on Norway of the duty to respect the principle of non-refoulement—^that
is, jurisdiction—^was satisfied. As soon as the Tampa's master could reasonably have
become aware that his involuntary passengers were in flight from the risk of being
persecuted, Norway's obligations under refugee law were engaged.
This analysis is confirmed by state practice during the exodus by boat of
Vietnamese refugees during the 1970s and 1980s. In that context, UNHCR's
Executive Committee authorized special responsibility-sharing initiatives, all
predicated on flag state responsibility for refugees rescued.^ The "DISERO
29. Discussion of Indonesia's duties under refi:^ee law is in my view entirely hypothetical, as
Indonesia is not a party to the Refugee Convention or Protocol. The assertion of liability
is possible only if one accepts the highly questionable notion that the duty of nonrefoulement is a matter of customary international law. See note 14 supra.
30. See e.g. Loizidou v. Turk^,(1995) 310 Eur. Ct H.R. (Series A), in which the Turkey was
found liable for infringement of the European Convention on Human Rights for acts
committed by its armed forces in Cyprus. The essence of the relevant holding was that
rmauthorized military action abroad amounts to jurisdiction sufficient to engage
responsibility under human rights la
31. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 24, at Art. 98(l)(b)
32. Under international law, "[ejvery State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and
control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag":
Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 24, at Art. 94(1).
33. In a note to its Sub-Committee of the Whole on Intemational Protection, UNHCR struck
a careful balance, writing that "[i]t is, of course, correct that by boarding a vessel, the
refiigee comes under the jurisdiction of the flag State which is considered to exercise
jurisdiction over the ship on the high seas. There is, however, no valid legal basis for
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Scheme" was established to provide for the resettlement of refugees rescued at sea
by ships flying flags of convenience or registered in "... countries which for special
reasons are unable to guarantee permanent admission to refugees," while the
"RASRO Scheme" established an international pool of resettlement places "...
designed to alleviate the burden on flag States" of protecting all refiigees brought
onboard their ships.^'' These initiatives sought to define creative ways to sharesDut
responsibilities that would otherwise have fallen to the rescuing vessel's flag state
alone, thus affirming the legal presumption of flag state initial responsibility to
honour Refugee Convention duties. Given Indonesia's less-than-admirable record of
human rights protection and the fact that it has shown no coimnitment to honour
refugee law in practice,^^ Captain Rinnan's decision to head for Australian territory
was perhaps a fortunate one from the perspective of ensuring Norway's compliance
with its duty of non-refoulement?^
considering that by boarding a vessel a refugee has entered the territory of the State
exercising jurisdiction over the ship. Moreover, even if physical presence on the ship
were regarded as tantamount to presence in the territory, this would not in the present
[state] of international law constitute an obUgation for the flag State to grant durable
asylum": UNHCR, "Problems Related to the Rescue of Asylum-Seekers in Distress at
Sea," U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/18,26 August 1981, at para 23. For purposes of Arts. 33 of the
Refugee Convention, however, no more than de facto or de jure jurisdiction is required
for responsibility to arise. Accord Jon L. Jacobson, "At-Sea Interception of Alien
Migrants: Intemational Law Issues," (1992) 28 Willamette Law Review 811, at 814: "My
approach is to suggest that whenever and wherever a state exercises jurisdiction—
territorial or otherwise—over ahen migrants, the state's refugee and non-return duties
imder intemational law are engaged..." See also James Z. Pugash, "The Dilemma of the
Sea Refugee: Rescue Without Refuge," (1977) 18(3) Harvard Intemational Law Journal
577, at 592.
34. UNHCR, "Problems Related to the Rescue of Asylum-Seekers in Distress at Sea," U.N.
Doc. EC/SCP/35,28 August 1984, at paras. 7-8. See also W. Courtland Robinson, Terms
of Refuge (1998), at 192.
35. "Indonesia's Department of Foreign Affairs... was reported as saying, 'If Australian
authorities refused because they don't have proper documents, we don't see any reason to
let them in'": Kirsten Lawson, "Stand-off at sea over boat people," The Canberra Times,
28 August 2001, at A-1. More generally, "Indonesia, struggling to cope with more than 1
million of its own citizens fleeing civil unrest, does not want the refugees": "Australia
again spums refugees on ship," The Washington Post, 30 August 2001, at A-23.
36. As a matter of intemational refugee law, particular caution would be warranted as neither
Indonesia nor Singapore is a party to the Refugee Convention. Indeed, even when the
proposed transferee state is a party to the Convention, there can be no presumption that a
state's non-refoulement obligations are validly transferable. Because the duty to avoid the
return of refugees directly or indirectly requires a focus on the actual practice of states,
not simply on their formal commitments, Norway would have been obliged to make aU
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Australia's order to Captain Rinnan not to enter Australia's territorial sea—
which forced him to remain 13.5 miles offshore for two days—^was likely in
contravention of the international legal duty of coastal states to allow ships in
distress to enter their waters.^^ Once notified by the master of the Tampa of not only
its overloading,'* but more particularly of the medical emergencies and insufBciency
of food and water onboard," Australia also had a duty to render effective assistance.
Under the Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, "fp]arties shall ensure that
necessary arrangements are made for the provision of adequate search and rescue
services for persons in distress at sea round their coasts (emphasis added)."'"' A
reasonable inquiries, logically including by consultation with TINHCR, to ensure that it
would not in fact be exposing the rescuees to the risk of refoulement by discharging them
onto the territory of any other state.
37. Under the customary international legal doctrine of entry in distress "... reconfirmed in
Article 18 of the Law of the Sea Convention... a vessel that finds itself in difficulty at sea
[enjoys] an imqualified right to enter foreign waters, stopping and anchoring tiiere as
necessary. A similar right... applies to a vessel where entry in the coastal state's territorial
waters is the result offorce majeure..."'. Jean Pierre Fonteyne, "Skulduggery on the high
seas," The Canberra Times, 11 September 2001, at A-9.
38. It was reported that "[t]he Norwegian Maritime Safety Board, responsible under
international law for the seaworthiness certification of Norwegian vessels... informed
[Captain Rinnan] that he was not allowed to sail his vessel any further with the asylumseekers on board This was due to the fact that the Tampa was not equipped with the
internationally mandated minimum safety equipment for more than a maximum of 50
passengers": ibid.
39. The response of the Austrahan prime minister was that "... the Royal Flying Doctor
Service had been m contact via radio and concluded one iUness had been feigned and
another three very mild...'Every situation has stories of hunger strikes, every situation
has the threat of people doing self damage, of jumping overboard even suggestions of
throwing children overboard,' [Howard] said 'All of those things are talked about in a
situation like this, but on the other hand I have to worry... about a situation where we
appear to be losing control of the flow of people coming into this country. We have
decided in relation to this particular vessel to take a stand'"; Kiisten Lawson, "Refugee
stalemate: Troops mass on Christmas Island, U.N. urges resolution," The Canberra
Times, 29 August 2001, at A-1. On the other hand, the Norwegian ambassador who
visited the Tampa observed that"... the boat was running out of drinking water and there
were three seriously ill people ^oard": Lincoln Wright, "UN plans to end Tampa crisis,"
The Canberra Times, 1 September 2001, at A-1.
40. Supra note 25, at Annex, Ch. 2.1.1. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea, 1974, done Nov. 1, 1974, entered into force 25 May 1990, Ch. V, Reg. 15, is to
simitar effect; this convention entered into force for both Australia and Norway on Feb.
3,2000. "Both Australia and Norway are parties to the SOLAS Convention... Austraha is
now requesting the vessel to breach rules which Australia has accepted as an intemational
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situation of distress is defined as one "... where there is a reasonable certainty that a
vessel or a person is threatened by grave and imminent danger and requires
immediate assistance (emphasis added)."'" Deference was due to Captain Rinnan's
assessment that this stand^d was met,''^ in particular given the consequential risk to
the physical security of the Captain and his crew."^
A sound case can also be made that even though at this point the Tampa was still
outside Australian territorial waters, primary legal responsibihty to protect the
refiigees onboard nonetheless passed from Norway to Australia. At 13.5 miles off the
coast of Christmas Island, the Tampa was inside Australia's self-declared
"contiguous zone."'*'' If a state party opts to establish a contiguous zone,''^ refugees
present within the area of expanded jurisdiction may be able to claim the benefit of
the same rights that apply to refugees in or within the state's territory.''® Particularly

41.
42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

commitment The situation is no longer an emergency, and there is thus no justification
for forcing the vessel to continue to sail with more passengers than it is permitted to
carry. The shipwrecked persons must be brought ashore on Christmas Island in order to
be transported further... Norway believes that this matter creates serious doubt as to the
working of international commitments and arrangements for the rescue of seafarers and
passengers of ships": Communication from Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Thorbjom Jagland to Secretary-General William A. O'Neil of the International Maritime
Organization, 31 August 2001, l.MO. Circular Letter No. 2337 [on file with the author],
5«pranote25, at Armex, Ch. 1.11.
"Whether a vessel in fact is 'in distress' is in the first instance the captain's caU, and it is
a judgement Captain Rinnan actually made at the time and communicated to the
Australian authorities before steering his vessel into Australian waters": Jean-Pierre
Fonteyne, "Skulduggery on the high seas," supra note 37.
Accord Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, "Asylum-seekers afloat in imcertainty," supra note 11:
"Should... the conditions on board the vessel eventually deteriorate to such an extent that
it could reasonably be regarded as itself in distress... that could then possibly entitle it to
enter our waters under the principle of 'entry in distress.'"
Australia declared and enacted a contiguous zone as part of the Seas and Submerged
Lands Act of1973, Act No. 161 of 1973, as amended The definition employed there is
explicitly said to be "the same meaning as in Article 33" of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of theSea: id. at s.3(l).
"In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone, the coastal
State may exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its customs,
fiscal, irmnigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial
sea...": Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 24, at Art 33(1).
"Article 33 makes no exceptions for State conduct that occurs outside the territory or
territorial waters of the contracting State. Rather, the obligations which it imposes arise
wherever a State acts": "Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents," filed as Doc. No. 92-344, 21
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where the nature of the claim to extended legal competence includes the right to
regulate the movement of persons, the reciprocal nature of rights and obligations
argues strongly for the extension of legal responsibility to cover actions within the
contiguous zone/' Having asserted the international right to enforce its iimnigration
laws within this zone extending 24 miles from its coastline, Australia's authority to
exercise jurisdiction should logically be imderstood to be subject to its general
international legal obligations, including those under the Refugee Convention/^
While no refugee within the contiguous zone is "inside" Australia (which would give
rise to additional entitlements under international refirgee law), jurisdiction alone is,
for reasons previously discussed, sufficient to engage the duty of non-refoulement.
Thus, the determined effort to keep the Tampa outside Australian territorial waters,
while perhaps important to avoid engaging a broader range of Austrahan domestic
legal obligations, should in principle be deemed insufficient to escape international
legal responsibility.
The issue of the international legal significance of enby into Australia's
contiguous zone, however, became moot once the Tampa, fearing the serious
deterioration of on-board conditions, entered Australia's territorial seas, clearly a
part of Australian territory for purposes of international law."*' Under international
December 1992, in the case of McNary v. Haitian Centers Cotmcil Inc. In the result,
however, the majority of the United States Supreme Court determined that Art 33 of the
Refugee Convention was not intended to apply extraterritoriaUy, in particular on the high
seas; Sale, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, et al.
PetitionersV. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., etal,113 S. Ct 2549 (1993).
47. "Responsibility is the necessary coroUary of a right All rights of an international
character involve international responsibility. If the obligation in question is not met,
responsibility entails the duty to make reparation": Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims, 6
R.I.A. A. 615, at 641, per Ruber J. iSee a/jo text swpra at notes 18-19, and 29. Asimilar
approach is evident in the classical approach of the common law. As observed by Lord
Scarman in R. v. Home Secretary, ex parte Khawaja, [1984] AC 74, at 111, "There is no
distinction between British nationals and others. He who is subject to English law is
entitled to its protection. The principle has been in the law at least since Lord Mansfield
freed 'the black' mSommersett's Case..."
48. It is difficult to conceive a principled rationale for the contrary view that a state should be
deemed legally entitled to treat the contiguous zone as an area within which it is entitled
to enforce its immigration laws free from the legal constraints that would ^ply within
territory clearly under its sovereign authority.
49. "The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal
waters... to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea. The sovereignty
extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. The
sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to the Convention and to other

148

La mondialisation : Lespersonnes, le profit et le progres

law, the entry of the refugees into Australia's territory expanded their range of
provisional entitlements to include the rights to religious freedom, access to rationing
and primary educational systems, the right to receive identity documents, and
exemption from penalization for illegal entry.^" Perhaps most significantly, Austraha
was ^so at this point prohibited from imposing restrictions on the freedom of
movement of the refugee claimants unless able to justify them. Under Art. 31(2) of
the Refugee Convention, authorities are allowed to detain refugees only for reasons
generally agreed to be justified, including the need to satisfy themselves of an
asylum seeker's identity, or to determine whether or not he or she presents a security
risk to the asylum state.^' This critical international legal limitation on the right of
states to detain refugees appears not even to have been considered in adjudicating the
apphcation for habeas corpus in the Federal Court.^^
rules of international law (emphasis added)": Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra
note 24, at Alt 2.
50. The threat by Australia to penalize the captain of the Tampa for unauthorized entry into
Australian waters does not, perhaps regrettably, run afoul of Art. 31 of the Refugee
Convention. The drafters considered, but ultimately rejected, a proposal to exempt also
organizations assisting refugees from penalties. But they nonetheless encouraged
governments as a matter of sormd policy to exercise discretion in this regard. See
Statement of Mr. Juvigny of France, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR40, 22 August 1950, at 9.
Accord Statement of Mr. Henkin, id. at 8; and Statement of the Chairman, Nfr. Larsen of
Denmark, id. at 9. The refugees themselves, however, were immime from penalization
for their illegal entry, as they made their intention to seek refugee status known
immediately and indicated their preparedness to cooperate in fidl in the processing of
their claims.
51. The refugee must, of course, submit to all necessary investigations of his or her claim to
protection, and file whatever documentation or statements are reasonably required to
verify the claim to refugee status. But once any such prerequisite obligations have been
discharged, the refugee's presence has been regularized in the receiving state, and
refugee-specific restrictions on freedom of movement must come to an end. hf the asylum
country elects not to expel the refugee, but instead provisionally to allow him or her to
remain in its territory (for example, while undergoing refugee status determination).
Article 26 becomes the applicable standard for restrictions on internal movement.
52. The fact of Australian accession to the Refugee Convention is surely a valid constraint on
vdiatever prerogative power to exclude remains in force in Australia, and ought logically
to have defined the legality of any detention predicated on the exercise of the executive
prerogative. This general question was raised by French J. in the Full Federal Court, but
not answered. 'Tt is questionable whether entry by the Executive into a convention
thereby fetters the executive power under the Constitution, albeit there may be
consequences in relation to the processes to be applied in the exercise of that power or
relevant statutory powers... In this case, in my opinion, the question is moot because
nothing done by the Executive on the face of it amounts to a breach of Australia's
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However, the legality of Australia's decision to force the refugees to leave its
territorial sea aboard the Manoora, rather than admitting them to its refugee status
determination system, turns on a more subtle question. This is because no refiigee
has the right to be granted "asylum," understood in the sense of access to a
permanent or durable status in the state to which his or her protection request is
addressed.'^ Until and unless a refugee meets the requirements for protection against
expulsion under Art. 32—^namely, that he or she is "lawfiilly in [the state party's]
territory"—^the governing provisions are Arts. 31 and 33 of the Refugee Conventioa
Under the combination of these provisions, a state party is not precluded from
expelling a refugee claimant from its territory during the earliest phases of refugee

obligations in respect of non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention": Full Federal
Court Decision, supra note 2, per French J., at para. 203. The outline of a contrary
position is clear in the dissent of Chief Justice Black, who observed that"... the national
interest, as contemplated by the provisions of the [Migration] Act, includes recognition of
Australia's protection obligations under the Convention..."; and most critically, that"... if
the detainee has a claim for refugee status, a range of rights derive from Australia's
domestic conferral ofrights pursuant to the Refiigee Convention..."; id. at paras. 44, 61.
53. Bill FreUck has recently made an eloquent case that while the Refugee Convention "does
not., explicitly promise asylum," an effective duty to assimilate persons determined to be
refugees may nonetheless be asserted based on "... the suasive power of non-binding
language" in Art. 34 of the Refugee Convention: Bill Frelick, "Secure and Durable
Asylum: Article 34 of the Refugee Convention," [2001] World Refiigee Survey 42, at 42,
45.1 am attracted to Frelick's point that the placement of Art 34 immediately after the
duty of non-refoulement stipulated in Art 33 affirms the logic of assimilating refugees
who cannot safely be returned to their country of origin, but this logical symmetry is not
a source of legal obligation. But Frelick errs in suggesting that there is an "...
unmistakable emphasis [in] the Convention... on a refiigee's willingness to return. The
Convention... does not limit its protection only to persons for whom objective conditions
make it impossible to return; instead, it specifically directs states to recognke a refiigee's
willingness or unwillingness to return based on his or her fear, as its guide": id. at 48.
This not so: the notion of a "well-founded fear of being persecuted" is not an invitation to
treat asylum seekers differently based upon their level of trepidation or subjective
apprehension, but is rather a direction to evaluate the objective soundness of their
forward-looking apprehension of risk. This approach is not only consistent with the
human rights context and objects and purposes of the Refiigee Convention itself (see
James C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (1991), at 66-70), but allows Art. 1(AX2)
to be read in consonance wifii the Convention's clauses on cessation of refugee status due
to (objective) change of circumstances. Frelick's analysis pointedly ignores Arts. 1(C)(5)
and 1(C)(6) which allow states to withdraw refugee status on the basis of a purely
objective assessment of present risk without reference to subjective apprehension or
voluntariness.
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reception. It is only barred from doing so mechanistically, or without scrupulous
regard for the simultaneously applicable duty of non-refoulement.^^
The authors of a recent report for the Australian ParUamentaty Library suggest
that notwithstanding special "migration zone" legislation—^under which non-citizens
are deemed not to have entered Australia unless they enter a part of Australia within
the domestically defined "migration zone," which does not include its territorial
sea^^—^the refugees aboard the Tampa were not only "present" in Austraha, but were
also "legally present" there.^® This is a critical distinctioa If it is correct that
domestic Australian law, like that of many states, expressly authorizes refugees in
54. The Refugee Convention is completely silent on procedural concerns, and does not even
require the establishment of a formal system to verify refugee status. It rather grants state
parties tremendous flexibility to administer refugee law as they wish, but subjects that
discretion to a duty rigorously to respect the substantive protection requirements of the
treaty
55. Australia's "migration zone" includes land above the low watermark and sea within the
limits of a port in a State or Territory but does not include the sea within a State or
Territory or the 'territorial sea' of Australia: Migration Act 1958, as amende4 ss.5(l) and
7. While Australia has attempted to escape much legal responsibility in its territorial seas,
such efforts are of no value as matters of international law. "The provision in the
Migration Act which in effect excludes territorial waters from Australia's domestically
created 'Migration Zone' is internationally incapable of excluding [the duty of nonrefoulement]... As the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties )Article 27)
expressly indicates, domestic legislation carmot be used to escape treaty obligations...":
Jean-Pierre Fonfeyne, "Skulduggery on the high seas," supra note 37.
56. "With respect to the Tampa incident, these obligations seem to have a peculiar operation.
Under the Migration Act 1958 it is an offence to 'enter Australia' without a vdid visa.
Under the Act to 'enter Australia' is to 'enter the Migration Zone.' The 'Migration Zone'
only includes the physical territory of Australia and seas within a State or Territory port.
However, under the Act, a criterion for a protection visa is that 'the applicant for the visa
is a non-citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the
Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol'. The Migration Act 1958
does not define 'in Australia' but it expressly provides that the expression 'enter
Australia' is not intended to confine the ordinary meaning of 'in Australia'. Under the
Interpretation Act 1901 'Australia' is taken to mean 'the Commonwealfli of Australia
and, •when used in a geographical sense, includes the Territory of Christmas Island'.
References to Australia include the 'coastal sea' of Australia and 'coastal sea' includes
the 'temtorial sea'. Thus, arguably, a person within the territorial sea is 'lawfully' in
Australia, in the sense that 'Australia' is defined rmder domestic law. As such, the person
is a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations 'rmder the Refugees
Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol'": Australian Parliamentary Library,
"Bills Digest No. 41 2001-02: Border Protection Bill 2001" (2001), archived at
www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/ 2001-02/ 02bd041.htm

Globalism: People, Profits and Progress

151

flight from persecution to be granted an entry visa on that basis, this legislative
authorization is a basis for arguing that persons seeking refugee protection are
"lawfully in" its territory and entitled to benefit from Article 32's constraints on
expulsion This means that Australia would have had to invoke national security or
public order grounds to expel the refugees, and that any valid decision to expel
would have to be reached on the basis of a procedurally fair inquiry—a requirement
clearly not adhered to in the case of the Tampa refugees, who received no hearing of
any kind.
The contrary position is that the provision of the Australian Mgrafton Act 1958
which requires an appUcant for a (refugee) protection visa to be inside its territory
does not amount to an authorization for persons to come into its territory to apply for
such a visa, but merely excludes those not inside its territory from seeking
protection. That is, the provision is intended to act as a bar, not as an implied
afSrmation of entitlement. Under this reading, the failime to include-all of the
territorial sea as part of the domestically enforced "migration zone" in which
unauthorized entry is subject to penalization is not a basis to assert that a refugee's
presence is legal. At most, it would mean that the refugee's presence is "not
unlawful," a notion that falls short of the affirmative content of true "lawful
presence." Without doubt, this imderstanding is easier to square to the general
approach of Australian migration law, which has in recent years shown no propensity
to exempt refugees from a rigorously exclusionist vision.
If one assumes that the Tampa refugees were present, but not "lawfully present,"
in Australian territory by virtue of their entry into the territorial waters around
Christmas Island, refugee law posed no impediment to Australia sending the
rescuees from the Tampa onward to New Zealand: there were clear guarantees made
of admission to that coimtry's highly regarded refugee status determination system,
and no practice there that would suggest a risk of refoulement. However, the sending
of refugees to Nauru, a non-state party with no history of refugee reception and no
governmental structures in place to oversee refiigee protection, was less obviously a
legally responsible act It nonetheless appears in fact that the refugees sent to Naiuu
were not thereby subjected by Australia to the risk of indirect refoulement. Not only
is it difficult to imagine how the refugees would leave Nauru in practical terms, but
the conditions there—^while not ideal''—are unlikely to be deemed sufficiently
egregious to have effectively forced away any of the rescuees who in fact were to
leave Naum.

57. "Under the tin roofs of the camp huts, the temperature easily hits 40C, and coupled with
tropical humidity is almost unbearable. But conditions back home are even more dire
afler two decades of civil war [and] the worst drought in memory": "100 Afghans
welcomed to tiny island," Toronto Star,20 September 2001, at A-18.
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The more vexing question is whether Australia breached international law by
effectively divesting the refugees of the ability to assert rights under the Refugee
Convention which they had by virtue of their former presence in areas imder the
jurisdiction of (and subsequently, within the territory of) a state party. While they
had acquired only a minimalist set of refugee rights in Australia, even those
entitlements disappeared upon arrival in Naxmi.^^ Whatever protection they enjoy de
facto in Nauru is entirely vulnerable to the exercise of political discretion in a way
that "would not be true in a state party to the Refugee Convention. But on balance, the
flexibility which inheres in states by virtue of the limited applicabihty of Art. 32 of
the Refugee Convention suggests that there is no clear legal basis to contest the
Austrahan reallocation scheme. If the refiigees were never lawfully present on
Australian territory (including in its territorial waters), sending them onward to a
non-state party is within the bounds of the Refiigee Convention so long as there is no
foreseeable risk of direct or indirect refoulement. The gap between refugee law and
immigration law is thus perhaps all too clear for many refugee advocates.
4. What More General Lessons Should be Learned?
Standing back from the specifics of the legal analysis, I wish to focus here briefly on
a few critical points which to my mind inform the larger question of what must be
done to ensure a hiture for refugee protection.
The most basic lesson, of course, is that the existing legal rules of refugee
protection can, m most cases—^assmning both state accession and good faith
appUcation—ensure that the most basic interests of refugees are met in a way that is
non-absolutist, yet comprehensive. So long as jurisdiction is understood to be a
sufficient connection to engage the duty of non-refoulement, it is really only when
refugees are located on the high seas that they fall outside the piuview of the existing
refiigee law regime. And even on the high seas, as analysis of this case shows,
refugee law responsibilities will follow automatically when actions are taken in line
with international legal duties to establish search and rescue zones, and to respond to
distress calls by rescuing refugees at risk on the high seas.
58. Moreover, if rather than being shipped to Nauru the refiigees had been allowed to remain
in Australia for a period of "temporary" protection (even if denied access to the formal
status determination procedure), the refiigees would thereby have gone on to acquire
additional rights under the Refiigee Convention, namely to engage in self-employment,
enjoy internal freedom of movement, and to be protected against eiqmlsion. This is a very
practical concern, as the Tampa refugees admitted to Nauru have been denied the right to
engage in any constructive work, remunerated or not, and are forced to live in a fenced
compound under constant guard; Patrick Barkham, 'Taradise lost awaits asylum seekers,"
The Guardian,11 September 2001, at 3.
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My point is not that this is a fail-safe protection system—refiigees at risk do go
undetected on the high seas, and even on land state participation in the Refugee
Convention is less than universal. But the much more frustrating problem—^precisely
because it is so much more readily remediable—is the absence of a shared
understanding of the ways in which existing rules play out in particular factual
contexts, and of a concomitant determination by the international supervisory
authority, UNHCR, to bring those rules to bear rather than simply encouraging states
to "resolve the impasse" among themselves.^® Yet sadly, the international community
seems determined to re-invent the wheel each time a major refugee crisis emerges,
resorting to ad hoc arrangements which may or may not work in time to ensure that
refugees are not left unprotected or worse.
But even if we can reach a consensus that rules of international refugee law do
matter; even if we can agree on the ways in which those rules are to be appUed in
practice; and even if the UNHCR can be convinced that it must never waiver from
the promotion of refugee law as the irreducible minimmn foundation for the
resolution of protection challenges; we are still left with a fundamental dilemma. The
feet that a state party which has jimsdiction over a refugee automatically owes that
person respect for a core set of essential rights, including to protection against
refoulement, is a critical strength of refugee law: for the reasons described above, it
ensures that few refugees fall through the cracks of the protection regime. Yet
precisely because jurisdiction alone is sufficient to assign full legal responsibility for
the refugee to a single state, the existing mechanisms of intemational protection
appear absolutist in a way that is both imprincipled and imsustainable.
The saga of the Tampa illustrates neatly some of the unresolved inequities in the
apphcation of legal rules to protect refugees. After all, Australia only became
involved because it had been willing to patrol an area of the high seas which the state
with true responsibility, Indonesia, had negligently failed to oversee. Why should
Austraha be penalized because it took steps beyond its formal duties to issue a
distress call which saved the lives of the passengers of the Palapal More generally,
why should Australia—^as one of the very few state parties to the Refugee
59. Kirsten Lawson, "Refugee stalemate: Troops mass on Christmas Island, U.N. urges
resolution," supra note 39. Even as Australian troops boarded and took control of the
Tampa inside Australian tenitorial waters, "[tjhe U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
said it was 'very concemed' about the refugees and was trying to bring the
representatives for Norway, Australia and Indonesia together in Geneva to negotiate a
solution": "Australia Again Spurns Refugees on Ship," The Washington Post, 30 Au^st
2001, at A-23. UNHCR did subsequently oppose several Austrahan legislative initiatives
and refused to be indefinitely involved in the offshore processing of interdicted refugees,
but its reluctance or impreparedness immediately to affirm the applicability of key
intemational legal norms is disquieting

154

La mondialisation : Les personnes, le profit et le progres

Convention in the region—^be put in the position of needing to pick up
responsibilities more logically understood to be regional, or indeed global, in nature?
What is the logic of seeing Australia as having given up its right to share-out
protection responsibilities if its laws are understood to authorize refugees to seek its
protection? Even if Australia's greater wealth and stability are said to justify a
special responsibility, was it really fair that Norway—^an equally prosperous and
stable state, but much farther from most refugee-producing regions—^was able to
escape its duties by the act of its captain taking his ship into Australian waters
without that country's authorization?
On the other hand, why should Norway be saddled with sole responsibility for
the welfare of the refugees just because a ship flying its flag happened to be nearest
to the site of the tragedy? What would the consequences have been if the captain of
that ship had not been a person of sufficient courage to take onboard many more
drowning passengers than his vessel could safely accommodate; or if the owners of
the ship had pressured the captain to exercise his discretion negatively so as to avoid
what became in fact very serious delays in the delivery of its $20 million cargo?®*
Perhaps most fundamental of all, why should the refugees have been forced to
trek halfway aroimd the world in order to present their refugee claims to a coimtiy
from which they believed meaningful protection would be forthcoming?®' And once
60. Once at the scene of the sinking fishing boat. Captain Rinnan might in an extreme
circumstance have declined to effect the rescue of all those at risk. If bringing aboard the
433 persons actually in distress - not just the 80 persons suggested by the original
Australian rescue call - would in fact have jeopardized the seaworthiness or essential
safety of his ship, the duty to rescue does not apply. The Convention on the Law of the
Sea, supra note 22, at Art 98(1) stipulates that the duty of the master of a ship to rescue
persons in distress inheres only "... in so far eis he can do so without serious danger to the
ship, the crew or the passengers..." It is not inconceivable that this case might have been
made; the Tampa was licensed to carry only 50 persons, yet after the rescue had more
than eight times that number aboard.
61. While not ignoring the fact that refugees and economic migrants are often part of the
same human flows, and that it is a much bigger project to create the conditions which will
attenuate risk-taking by those in search of better opportunities rather than of protection,
my point here is that we should nonetheless commit ourselves to the more practicable
project of making local options available to genuine refiigees. "Clutching black plastic
bin-bags filled with clothes, some of the asylum seekers also held a baimer thanking the
Nauru government.. [Mjany of the asylum seekers said they still wanted to start new
lives in Australia. But at least one had accepted defeat. 'We wanted to go. Unfortunately,
Australia closed the door for us,' he said": Patrick Barkham, "Migrants step ashore to
flowers and fences," The Guardian, 20 September 2001, at 17. Many of the Iraqis who
arrived at the same time, however, refiised to leave the Manoora: id. That any of the
refugees would accept their fate, much less tharik Nauruans for what can only be
described as less than ideal conditions of asylum suggests that many would willingly
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having found a way to enter Australian jurisdiction, why should the refugees
effectively lose their acquired refugee rights by virtue of an arguably legal transfer of
responsibihty for them to the government of Nauru, a state which is not a party to the
Refugee Convention? On the other hand, should these refugees—who blackmailed
Captain Rinnan by threats of suicide to head for Australia—^be entitled to benefit
from their threats?®^ And why should this small group of Afghans be the subject of
special concern? At least on Naium their basic safety is assured, in contrast to that of
the many long-suffering Afghan refugees who could not afford to travel to Australia
or were otherwise unable to flee their own region.
The seeming arbitrariness of the way in which refugee law would liave
apportioned duties and granted rights in the case of the Palapa refugees is in critical
ways linked to the complaints traditionally voiced by the countries of South and
Southeast Asia (among others) through which the Afghans of the Palapa, as well as
the Iraqis of the Aceng, likely passed. Given their geographical position in a part of
the world exposed to seemingly endemic flows of large numbers of genuine
refiigees, why would they sign on to the Refugee Convention, thereby exposing
themselves to sole legal responsibility to honour the rights of whatever refugees
show up at their frontiers? Why should these coimtries be expected to rely on vague
promises of voluntary assistance from UNHCR or other states—^which usually
arrives late, if at all? Without real guarantees of support, would it not be
irresponsible for them to assme their own populations that acceding to the Refugee
Convention will not, in practice, result in the sorts of serious chaos faced by other
states (such as Tan2ania, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Pakistan) wliich
attempted to play by the rules of intemationd refugee law?
Thus it is that refugee protection—^in both the less developed and in the
developed worlds—is in serious trouble, not because of any fundamental flaw in the
actual rules of international law which in principle govern the treatment of refugees,
but because of the failure of the international community to commit itself to a clearly
have accepted protection—had it been available in any meaningful sense—^much closer
to home.
62. "But, in any event, in order to persuade a court to grant any form of discretionary relief,
the occupants woidd need to confront the principle... that it is wrong that a person should
rely on his or her own unlawful act (here, in practically compeUing MV Tampa to divert
from Indonesia to Christmas Island) to secure an advantage which could not have been
obtained if the person had acted lawfully...": Full Federal Comt Decision, supra note 2,
per Beaumont J., at para. 107. On the other hand. Justice North had earlier taken a
different view of this issue. "While such persons no doubt make decisions about their
lives, those decisions should be seen against the background of the pressures generated
by flight from persecution. The totality of the circumstances of the rescuees is to be
considered and it is not adequately described as 'self-inflicted' in relation to a significant
number of the rescuees": Federal Court Decision, supra note 2, at paras. 67-68.
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dependable and visibly fair system under which burdens and responsibihties are
shared-out within the bounds of those legal conunitments. This is not a call for new
rules, but rather for new structures of implementation within which the rules will be
understood by states to be reconcilable with their most basic interests. There are
clear and workable proposals to achieve precisely these ends on the table,® but that
is precisely where they have remained.® Ironically, much creative thinking has
strived to learn the lessons from precisely the experiences of sharing initiated in
southeast Asia during the crisis of the boat people more than 20 years ago, fine-tuned
in mechanisms later employed in Africa and Latin America.
If we fail to systematize a system of collectivized protection, we invite criticism
of refugee law itself, rather than of its mechanisms of implementation. Worse still,
we invite de facto withdrawal from refugee law. For example, in the wake of the
Palapa events, Australia has enacted several new pieces of legislation® which inter
alia purport to excise Christmas Island and a munber of other remote territories from
AustraUa for refugee law purposes;® radically reduce access to the courts by
refugees;® and redefine by legislative fiat core portions of the supposedly non63. James C. Hathaway and R. Alexander Neve, "Making Memational Refugee Law
Relevant Again; A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection," (1997)
10 Harvard Human Ri^ts Joumal 115-211. The social science background studies upon
which the reform model is predicated are collected in James C. Hathaway, Reconceiving
International Refugee Law (1997). The scholarly commentary on this and other reform
proposal is helpfiilly summarized and assessed in Colin J. Harvey, "Talking About
Refugee Law," (1999) \2Q.) Joumal of Refugee Studies 101.
64. The issues of burden and responsibility sharing considered in the context of the
UNHCR's Global Consultations on Intemational Protection are restricted to situations of
mass influx, clearly an insufficiently broad inquiry to deal with situations of the kind
faced by the refugees of the Palapa and the Aceng: U.N. Doc. EC/GC/Ol/Rev.2, 9 May
2001. It is also regrettable that UNHCR opted to exclude resources which it did not
author from its list of research resources relevant to debate on this issue: U.N. Doc.
EC/GC/01/2,12 February 2001, at fii. 1.
65. See generally the Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001,
enacted with retrospective effect from 27 September 2001.
66. Migration Amendment (Excision From Migration Zone) Act 2001, with retrospective
effect from 27 September 2001.
67. "The courts are now prohibited from overturning refugee and other visa-related decisions
unless the decision-maker was not acting in good faith in making the decision; or the
decision is not reasonably capable of reference to the decision-making power given to the
decision-maker, or the decision does not relate to the subject matter of the legislation; or
the decision exceeded the limits set out in the Commonwealth Constitution": Migration
Act 1958, as amended with effect from Oct. 2, 2001: www.immi.gov.au/legislation/
lcl001_3.htm, visited 22 October 2001.
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derogable international legal definition of a "refugee."®^ The risk of failing to take
principled action to stave off such defensive actions, or at least clearly to delegitimate the rhetoric of unfairness which accompanies them, is thus all too real.®®
We simply cannot afford to persist in the usual pattern of vague understandings of
legal duties coupled with ad hocery in its implementation.
68. In particular, the government purports to exclude refugee claims based on family membership from
the scope of claims based on "membership of a particular social group," and asserts that the "for
reasons of (nexus) clause of the Convention is not satisfied unless the Convention ground is "the
essential and significant reason for the persecution": Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 6)
2001, with effect from 1 October 1 2001. While both amendments contradict dominant intemational
practice, the government of Australia nonetheless asserted that the goal of the amendments was to
"restore the application of the Refiigees Convention to its proper interpretation":
www.immi.gov.au/legislatioiyicl001_l.htm, visited 22 October 2001.
69. While a more objective observer might see Australia's refugee contributions as decidedly modest in
relation to its resources, the predominant domestic perception is very different Many Australians see
themselves (together with New Zealand) as geo-politically exposed to refugees in way that other
developed states are not: they are virtually alone in guaranteeing any semblance of due process to
refiigees in the region, and know that their stable political and economic circumstances are a beacon
to oppressed persons in many neighbouring states, and beyond. Whatever the objective reality, the
current system of individuated state responsibility for refugee protection, under which each state has
full responsibility to protect any and all refugees who arrive at its territory, is difficult to reconcile to
the Australian sense of vulnerability. Nor is the Australian concern unique: it was voiced by
Germany during the exodus from Bosnia, and at present by the United Kingdom which fears the
consequences of the failure of some of its key European partners fully to implement their refiigee
protection responsibilities.

